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HUNTING FOR QUARKS: CONSTITUTIONAL
TAKINGS, PROPERTY RIGHTS,
AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION
JEROLD S. KA YDEN*
"One distinguished commentator has characterized the
attempt to differentiate 'regulation'from 'taking' as 'the
most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of
contemporary land-use law ... one that may be the
lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the
quark. "
-Justice William J. Brennan, quoting CHARLES M. HAAR, LAND-USE
PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1976), in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 649 n.15 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."
-Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
* Associate Professor of Urban Planning, Harvard University Graduate School of
Design. A.B. 1975, Harvard College; J.D. 1979, Harvard Law School; M.C.R.P. 1979
Harvard University Graduate School of Design.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The close of the twentieth century bears witness to increasing
tensions between private property rights and government regulation.
Landowners complain that, under the guise of environmental laws and
land use regulations, public officials too often display gross insensitivity
to constitutionally protected private property. Many owners argue that
if an endangered species, wetland, historic landmark, or similar asset
located on private property is worth protecting, let the public pay for it.
Equally assertive voices from environmental and land use planning
camps frame the exercise of property rights in the context of broader
public interests. They emphasize that the right to private property is
not-indeed has never been-absolute, and that owners should use their
property in ways that respect the needs of neighbors and society.
The battle cry of both sides has reverberated in all three branches
of government, at both the national and state level. After fifty years of
relative quiescence, the United States Supreme Court ignited the modern
era's takings debate in 1978 with its Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City' opinion, and has not let up since.2 Through the 1980s
and 1990s, the Court has attempted to resolve what constitutes a taking
of private property by government regulation, whether compensation
must be paid for regulatory takings, when and where property owners
must bring their lawsuits, and similar issues. In its 1986 and 1991
Terms, the Court granted review to three land use cases each session, an
unprecedented foray into the arena.3 In 1994 the Court decided yet
another land use dispute pitting an owner against government in Dolan
v. City of Tigard.4 Lower federal and state courts have taken their cues
1. 438 U.S. 104 (1978)..
2. See, e.g., Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990); Pennell v.
City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 10 (1988); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo,
477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172 (1985); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982); San Diego Gas & Elee. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
3. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 503 U.S. 257 (1992);
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
4. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
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from the Supreme Court's frenetic pace and issued their own statements
on constitutional doctrine governing the land use debate.
Not content to be left out in the cold, the United States Congress
and numerous state legislatures have joined the fray, enacting or
considering laws granting statutory protection to landowners well beyond
that secured by the Constitution. Under so-called takings impact
assessment laws, government administrators must conduct assessments
of their regulations before enactment to ensure that they do not transgress
the constitutional line.' Under so-called compensation/diminution laws,
government agencies must pay monetary compensation to property
owners whenever their government actions decrease by more than a
specified percentage the value of private property.
As development creeps steadily outward from central cities to
environmentally sensitive areas in the countryside, the conflict between
property rights and government regulation will only accelerate. This
Article explores the constitutional framework for the property rights-
regulation conflict, with special attention paid to two recent United States
Supreme Court opinions. As the Court continues its century-long
struggle to define an acceptable balance between individual and societal
rights, it is apparent, at least to the justices, that this constitutional riddle
is not susceptible to bright-line solutions and glib answers. At the same
time, it is also clear that the court's latest articulations of takings
jurisprudence remain well within the modem constitutional framework
initially set forth in Penn Central and subsequently elaborated by cases
in the 1980s.
II. THE CONSTITUTION'S COMPENSATION REQUIREMENT
Lodged in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
as part of the Bill of Rights, the Just Compensation Clause commands,
*'nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."7 The purpose of the clause is to assure that individuals
5. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir.
1994); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Seawall Associates v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
976 (1989).
6. These laws mirror Exec. Order 12,630, adopted in the waning days of the Reagan
Administration in 1988, requiring federal executive agencies to conduct such reviews.
Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1988).
7. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
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do not bear "public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole."8 With roots reaching as far back as
King John's Magna Carta of 1215, this just compensation edict has
protected property owners against arbitrary and uncompensated govern-
ment seizure of property, while implicitly endorsing a government's
authority to take property for the public good.
Indeed, in its most straight forward application, the clause has
generated little controversy. To make possible the construction of
highways, dams, and other public facilities, governments at national,
state, and local levels have frequently exercised their power of eminent
domain to seize land from private owners, even if the landowners object.
Disputes have involved questions about the amount of compensation
offered, and occasionally about whether the purpose sought to be
achieved by the government was sufficiently "public,"9 rather than about
the government's basic authority to take private property.
As America became more industrialized in the late 1800s, the
government found it increasingly necessary to impose regulations,
especially on industrial activities, to protect the public's health and
safety. At times, such regulations severely impinged upon an owner's
use of property, and the question arose whether such restrictions
contravened some aspect of the Constitution. During the late 1800s and
early 1900s, the Supreme Court faced several of these conflicts and ruled
in favor of the government. For example, in Mugler v. Kansas,0 the
Court upheld a regulation prohibiting the manufacture of alcohol, even
though the effect of the law was to terminate the operation of a brewery.
In Hadacheck v. Sebastian," the Court approved a city law prohibiting
the operation of an existing brickyard in downtown Los Angeles, even
though the law allegedly diminished the value of the property from
$800,000 to $60,000, a decrease of more than 92 percent. In these and
similar cases, the challenged land uses could easily be classified as
common law nuisances, and landowners for centuries had understood that
their property rights were subject to the nuisance maxim, "sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas," translated "use your own property in such a
8. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
9. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984); Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. 1981).
10. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
11. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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manner as not to injure that of another."' 2
The question of whether a government regulation could contravene
the Just Compensation Clause, especially where it severely interfered
with the owner's use of his or her property, nonetheless persisted. In
1922, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes seemingly answered this mystery
when he announced in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,3 that if a
"regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."' 4 Justice
Holmes fully understood the precarious balance between the needs of the
government and the rights of individuals. He observed that
"[glovemment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law."' 5  Indeed, he rationalized under his theory of
"average reciprocity of advantage"' 6 that, while an owner loses through
restrictions on his or her property, the same owner gains from restrictions
placed on neighboring landowners. Still, Justice Holmes could not allow
his principle to swallow the clause itself, and thus found himself
enunciating a test that, with all its inexactness, made clear that there was,
after all, a constitutional line not to be crossed.
For many years after the Mahon case, the courts, governments, and
property owners operated under the "Model T" technology of Justice
Holmes' "goes too far" aphorism. After several cases in the 1920s which
reviewed the constitutionality of zoning and its application under the Due
Process Clause, 7 the High Court effectively absented itself from the
field for fifty years. This left the lower courts and the parties themselves
to tinker with the bare words of the Just Compensation Clause and
Justice Holmes' aphorism to govern disputes between property rights and
government regulation. In 1978, however, the Supreme Court reentered
the arena when it issued the most comprehensive judicial treatise ever on
the Just Compensation Clause, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City.8 There, the Court upheld against a takings claim the
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990).
13. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
14. Id. at 415.
15. Id. at 413.
16. Id. at 415.
17. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603
(1927); Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
18. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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constitutionality of New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law and
its application to the privately owned Grand Central Terminal. In so
doing, the Court spelled out standards that to this day guide the
constitutional analysis for takings challenges against land use and
environmental regulations.
New York City enacted its landmarks law in 1965, authorizing a
landmarks preservation commission to designate landmarks and historic
districts having 'a special character or special historical or aesthetic
interest or value as part of the development, heritage or cultural
characteristics of the city, state or nation."" 9 Under this authority, the
city's landmarks commission designated the 1913 Beaux Arts-style Grand
Central Terminal a landmark,2" thereby requiring its owner to seek the
commission's permission before altering or demolishing it. Penn Central,
the owner of Grand Central Terminal, applied to the commission to
develop a commercial office building directly above the terminal,2' a
request denied by the commission in its belief that such a building would
harm the landmark qualities of the terminal itself.22
The Court prefaced its constitutional analysis with the candid
admission that determining what constitutes a taking "has proved to be
a problem of considerable difficulty"' and that no "set formula" exists
to make such determinations.24 Instead, the Court announced an
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y]" focusing on the following three
factors: first, "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant";
second, "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations. .. ."; and third, "the character of the
govemmental action."'  Applying this three-factor inquiry to the facts
of the case, the Court concluded that Penn Central's claim did not rise
to the level of a taking. First, the commission's actions did not interfere
with Penn Central's long-standing "primary expectation"--the operation
19. Id. at 110 (quoting N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-1.0(n) (1976)).
20. Id. at 115.
21. Id. at 116.
22. Id. at 117-18.
23. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123.
24. Id. at 124.
25. Id. As an example of the application of the "character" factor, the Court stated
that a regulation authorizing a "physical invasion" would more likely constitute a taking
than a regulation "adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good." Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/5
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of the terminal.26 By inference, the expectation, if any, that Penn
Central may have had in developing the air rights above the terminal
held less weight. Second, Penn Central conceded that it earned a
"reasonable return" on its investment.2 Third, the landmarks law
granted Penn Central the possibility of transferring the restricted
development rights and utilizing them on eight adjacent parcels of land,
an opportunity that produced some economic value to the company.28
Penn Central thus makes clear that landowners are not entitled as a
matter of constitutional law to the most profitable use of their property.
Although the landmark designation denied the railroad company millions
of dollars in foregone revenue and dramatically diminished the value of
its property, the constitutional line was not crossed.
Two years after delivering the Penn Central magnum opus, a
unanimous Supreme Court composed a linguistic variation on the Penn
Central theme, framing the analysis as an outcome-determinative test
rather than as an impressionistic inquiry. In Agins v. City of Tiburon,29
the Court rejected a takings challenge to a local zoning ordinance
limiting an owner to the development of one to five units of housing on
a five-acre parcel. The justices pronounced that a regulation effects a
taking if it "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests...
or denies an owner economically viable use of his land."3 Because
zoning for open space preservation represented a substantial advancing
of legitimate state interest, and because on the facts before the Court it
was not apparent that the property owner had been denied economically
viable use, the Court upheld the zoning provision.3
Both the Penn Central "ad hoc," "no set formula," three-factor
inquiry and the Agins two-pronged disjunctive test have been cited,
mantra-like and interchangeably, by literally thousands of federal and
state court opinions. As applied, the constitutional hurdle for the
property owner remains high. First, owners are not entitled to the most
profitable use of their land. Second, substantial diminutions of value
caused by government regulations are uniformly tolerated. Third,
26. Id. at 136.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 137.
29. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
30. Id. at 260 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n.36).
31. Id. at 261-63.
19961
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virtually all public interests sought to be achieved by typical land use
and environmental laws are legitimate in the eyes of the constitution.
Fourth, the mechanisms embodied in such laws are usually found to
substantially advance the articulated public interest.
What happens, however, if and when the constitutional line is
crossed: Is the regulation merely invalidated, or must government pay
compensation to the landowner? For many years, public officials had
asserted that the existence of a compensation remedy would chill the
proper exercise of government authority on behalf of worthy public
goals, and that judicial invalidation of the government action should
suffice. Landowners had countered that the nonexistence of a compensa-
tion remedy allowed the government to violate the constitutional mandate
without penalty, and to return time and again with new regulations to
replace those invalidated by court action. The Supreme Court in 1987
resolved this argument in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles,32 holding that compensation must be paid to the
landowner, but only for the period of time the regulation effects a taking.
III. DOCTRINE CONTINUED AND ELABORATED: THE LUCAS AND
DOL4N DECISIONS
Two 1990s opinions from the Supreme Court have provided
additional insights into the constitutional approach, but importantly
without altering the fundamental framework set forth under Penn Central
and Agins. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,33 the Court
burnished the "economically viable use" test, while in Dolan v. City of
Tigard,34 it put flesh on the "substantially advancing" bones.
In 1986, David Lucas, a residential developer, purchased two vacant
parcels on the South Carolina coast for $975,000, with the intention of
constructing two single-family homes permitted as a matter of right under
then applicable regulations. s In 1988, the South Carolina legislature
enacted the Beachfront Management Act, in part based on legislative
findings that the "beach/dune system along the coast of South Carolina
32. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego,
450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (influential four-justice dissent
presaging First English outcome).
33. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
34. 114 S. CL 2309 (1994).
35. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
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... protects life and property by serving as a storm barrier which
dissipates wave energy and contributes to shoreline stability in an
economical and effective manner," and that development along the coast
"has jeopardized the stability of the beach/dune system, accelerated
erosion, and endangered adjacent property."36  The Act authorized the
South Carolina Coastal Council, a state administrative agency, literally
to draw a line in the sand, seaward of which new development would be
prohibited. Unfortunately for Lucas, his two lots fell on the seaward side
of the line drawn by the council, allowing him use of his lots for
beachcombing, campfires, and construction of a deck and walkway, but
preventing him from building houses.37
In court, Lucas conceded that the purpose of the South Carolina law
to protect the beaches was perfectly legitimate, but argued that he was
nonetheless entitled to compensation because of the law's draconian
effect upon the value of his parcels. A state trial judge agreed, finding
that the law reduced the lots' total value from $975,000 to zero dollars,
and holding that this effected a taking requiring payment of compensa-
tion in an amount of $1,232,387.50.38 The South Carolina Supreme
Court reversed, holding that when a regulation is designed "to prevent
serious public harm," as this one concededly was, then no compensation
is owed to the affected owner even when application of the regulation
results in an economic wipeout.39
In a closely divided 5-4 opinion, the United States Supreme Court
overturned the South Carolina decision, strongly suggesting, without
formally holding, that application of the Beachfront Management Act to
Lucas' property effected a taking.4" First, the Court reaffirmed the
A gins formulation that, where a regulation denies an owner all economi-
36. Id. at 2896 n.10.
37. Id. at 2889 n.2.
38. Id. at 2890.
39. Id. (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C.
1991)). It is worth remembering that the claim of serious public harm was hardly
chimerical. Hurricane Hugo swept into South Carolina causing substantial loss of life and
property in 1989.
40. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02. The Supreme Court sent the case back to the South
Carolina Supreme Court which, consistent with the Lucas decision, found a taking. Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992). Lucas and the South
Carolina Coastal Council subsequently settled the case, with Lucas receiving over $1.6
million in direct compensation, interim interest, attorneys fees, and costs.
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cally viable use of his or her property,4' then it amounts to a "categori-
cal" taking.42 For purposes of this analysis, a denial of "all economical-
ly viable use" is synonymous with a complete wipeout of value, that is,
from $975,000 to zero dollars. Second, the majority embellished its
"categorical" takings rule by undercutting it with an exception. As the
Court explained, when "background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance" would have authorized neighbors or other
affected parties to bring a judicial action against the landowner to stop
certain uses of property, then the State may accomplish the same result
(though no more) through, for example, newly enacted laws like the
Beachfront Management Act.43 After all, the new law could not be said
to be "taking" anything at all, because the landowner was never entitled
to conduct nuisance or other such uses on the property in the first place.
Put in terms most familiar to law students, the newly prohibited uses
were never part of the metaphorical "bundle of sticks" that law
professors are fond of conjuring to define "property" during the first year
of law school.
In footnote 7, the Court muddied what many considered settled
waters when it pondered aloud the correct unit of "property" to be
evaluated for purposes of determining whether a regulation denies all
economically viable use." Should courts focus exclusively on that
portion of the property burdened by the regulation, or should they look
instead to the entire amount of property-the so-called parcel as a
whole-held by the property owner?
In Lucas, the matter had resolved itself: both of Lucas' parcels were
fully restricted. What would happen, however, when a regulation
prohibited an owner from building anything on the proverbial "back
forty," but allowed development of the "front sixty"? Should courts find
a "categorical" taking of the back forty, or consider the regulation in the
context of its effect on all one hundred acres? Think about the
commonplace zoning ordinance that requires that buildings be set back
fifteen or twenty feet from the street. Should a property owner be able
41. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893, 2899. The Court inserted the word "all," and sprinkled
the opinion with additional adjectives---"beneficial," "productive," and "feasible"--to join
"viable," without any express indication that the supplemental words added new meaning
to the test.
42. Id. at 2893.
43. Id. at 2900.
44. Id. at 2894 n.7.
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to claim a Lucas categorical taking on the basis that one hundred percent
of his or her land parcel in the twenty foot setback area is sterilized from
development?45
In footnote 8, the Court explored the flip side of the "denial of all
economically viable use" coin, asserting that a taking may be found even
when an owner has not been denied all economically viable use. In such
a case, the majority suggested that property owners clothe their takings
claim in two of the Penn Central factors, the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and the effect on distinct investment-backed
expectations.46 Property owners thus enjoy two bites at the economic
apple: the first, to prove a total wipeout; the second, if needed, to prove
serious economic impact less than a total wipeout. Lower courts have
already heeded this call, suggesting takings even where some economic
value remains.47
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,48 the Court reviewed a commonplace
land use regulatory practice that requires property owners who want to
develop new projects to set aside portions of their land for streets, parks,
and other public infrastructure in return for government approval.49 The
question in such cases frequently turns on whether the burden being
imposed on the landowner reasonably addresses a harm or need
generated by the proposed development, or whether it disproportionately
burdens the landowner.
Mrs. Dolan owned a 9,700-square-foot plumbing and electric supply
store on a 1.67 acre plot along the main street of Tigard, a suburb of
Portland, Oregon.' Part of her land fell within the 100-year floodplain
for Fanno Creek, a waterway cutting through and bordering the parcel.5
Mrs. Dolan wanted to expand her store to 17,600 square feet and add a
45. For a recent journey down this road, see Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,
28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding a taking of part of a parcel of land where Army
Corps of Engineers denied landowner a § 404 dredge and fill permit).
46. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
47. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(contemplating a compensable taking when less than a total reduction in property value
occurs), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
48. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
49. Id. at 2312-13.
50. Id. at 2313.
51. Id.
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39-space paved parking lot.52 The city agreed to grant development
permission, as long as she dedicated to the city land falling within the
floodplain and an additional 15-foot-wide strip adjacent to the floodplain
for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway. 3 The cumulative land dedication
represented approximately 10 percent of her land parcel.54 The city
rationalized these conditions on the basis that the expanded store and
parking lot would create negative impacts on legitimate state inter-
ests-increased storm water runoff from the increase in impervious
surfaces would create flood hazards, and extra automobile traffic would
create congestion-and that the proposed conditions of the floodplain and
pathway dedication could mitigate these impacts.55
Seeking to build her proposed expansion without these conditions,
Mrs. Dolan challenged the city under the Just Compensation Clause and
won in the United States Supreme Court. At its core, the Court's 5-4
decision asked whether it was fair to demand that Mrs. Dolan set aside
parts of her property for public use. Because the conditions would
deprive her, without compensation, of one of the most essential sticks
from her property bundle-the right to exclude the public 6-the city
would have to demonstrate more to the justices than the simple
importance of floodplains and pathways to the public interest. The Court
announced the following two requirements to ensure fairness: first, there
must be an "essential nexus" between legitimate public purposes and the
conditions imposed on the development permit; 7 and second, there
must be "rough proportionality" between the nature and extent of the
conditions and the impact of the proposed development.58
The city easily met the "essential nexus" requirement, because the
floodplain and pedestrian/bicycle pathway conditions were clearly related
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2314.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2315.
56. Under the Just Compensation Clause, the Court has invalidated regulations
authorizing uninvited "permanent physical occupations" of private property by strangers,
be they human or a half-inch cable wire and box. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (striking down a New York City law
authorizing television cable company to lay cable on private property against owner's will).
57. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317. This requirement was originally announced in Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
58. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
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to the legitimate public purposes of preventing flooding and lessening
traffic congestion. The city flunked the "rough proportionality" test,
however, by failing to show how the public access provision of the
floodplain dedication would contribute to flood impact mitigation, 9 and
by demonstrating only that the pedestrian pathway "could," rather than
"would," offset some of the traffic generated by the larger store.60 "No
precise mathematical calculation is required," observed the majority, "but
the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the
required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of
the proposed development."' For the pathway, the "conclusory
statement that it could offset some of the traffic demand generated,"
would not suffice.62 The Court's message to cities should not discour-
age land use planning and regulation. Indeed, the majority remarks upon
"the commendable task of land use planning, made necessary by
increasing urbanization." 3 But the Court does serve notice on public
officials that special burdens imposed on landowners must be demonstra-
bly justified on the basis that such burdens proportionately address
impacts springing from the new development. In short, cities must do
their homework.
IV. CONCLUSION
Stepping back from the two-pronged disjunctive tests, the three-
factor inquiries, and the tantalizing footnotes, one conclusion stands out
about the Court's constitutional approach to the Just Compensation
Clause. While the Court's rhetoric may from time to time burnish the
mantle of private property rights,64 its actual rulings give ample
breathing room to government regulations enacted in furtherance of land
use and environmental goals. In the Court's view, the clause was not
59. Id. at 2320-21. In his dissent, Justice Souter criticized this conclusion on the basis
that, if anything, it described a failure of "essential nexus" rather than "rough proportional-
ity." Id. at 2330 (Souter, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 2321-22.
61. Id. at 2319-20 (footnote omitted).
62. Id. at 2322 (emphasis added)., Justice Stevens' dissent tweaked the majority for
its apparent decisive reliance on a single letter-a "c" for could rather than a "w" for
"would"--to reach its conclusion. Id. at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2322.
64. See id. at 2320; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833-35 nn.2,
3 (1987).
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fashioned with a jeweler's hammer to protect landowners against every
downward fluctuation in value caused by government action, any more
than it was designed to recoup from owners those positive increments of
value resulting from public investments and favorable permitting and
zoning actions. In the regulatory context, the clause is meant to
safeguard owners against government beyond the pale, acting as a check
on actions having an extreme impact on property use and value. For all
other cases, the political forces affecting the interaction between public
officials and private property owners will have to suffice.
Where does this constitutional jurisprudence leave the property
rights versus government regulation debate: Obviously not far enough
along to comfort the property rights camp. In search of more generous
deference, property owners have sought and received hearings in
Congress and many state legislatures on behalf of two species of statutes.
Under the takings impact assessment laws, government agencies are
required to assess in advance whether their future actions and regulations
may unconstitutionally impinge on property rights. This idea mimics the
"cenvironmental impact statement" assessment pioneered in the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969,65 which in theory does not stop
government from acting, but in practice can slow down or kill actions.
Among the states that have enacted such laws are Delaware, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.6 The second type of
legislation, "compensation/diminution" statues, requires payment of
compensation for government actions that diminish the value of a parcel
of property beyond a specified amount. Five states-Florida,
Mississippi, North Dakota, Texas, and Washington-have adopted such
laws.' The Texas statute grants to property owners the right to elect
invalidation of the regulatory action rather than compensation.68
If takings impact assessment and compensation/diminution statutes
become the rule, rather than the exception, at national and state levels,
then the constitutional jurisprudence painstakingly elaborated by the
Supreme Court will become temporarily irrelevant. But one thing is
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4332(2)(C) (1994).
66. For a geographical breakdown of those states with laws to protect property rights,
see 5 CQ REs. 513, 520 (1995) (citing the National Conference of State Legislatures).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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clear: the recent focus on legislative solutions by property owners
underscores the reality that the Supreme Court has declined to abandon
its careful case-by-case balanced takings jurisprudence in favor of a
radical shift in the direction of property rights.
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